Security Audit for AI-built apps
Built your app with Claude Code, Cursor or Lovable? This skill checks the code and your live site, ranks what it finds by what it could cost you, and writes the fix brief for your coding agent.
What does it check?
Secrets
Keys printed in logs, error messages, or returned in API responses.
Things served that should not be
Paid downloads, private documents or data exports placed in a public or static folder.
Who is allowed to do what
Permission checks done only in the browser: a hidden button is not access control.
Money
Payment webhooks that do not verify the signature, or parse the body before verifying it.
Input and output
Server code that fetches a URL the user supplies, which can be pointed at internal services.
Abuse and surprise bills
Unauthenticated endpoints that call a paid AI API, turning your key into a free service for strangers.
AI features
Model output rendered as HTML or executed as code.
Headers and configuration
Debug mode, verbose stack traces, or framework version headers in production.
Dependencies and supply chain
CI workflows using unpinned third-party actions, or printing secrets to logs.
Personal data
Personal data in logs, analytics events or URLs.
How is it different from other security audit skills?
Cloudflare published an excellent open-source security audit skill in September 2026. It is built for security researchers auditing large codebases. This one is built for founders shipping apps with AI tools. Both are free.
| Feature | Cloudflare security-audit-skill | authority.md Security Audit |
|---|---|---|
| Built for | Security research across many system types, from web apps and CI pipelines to native code and mobile | Web apps, SaaS products and stores built with AI coding tools |
| Checks the live site | No. Source review only, by design | Yes, with your permission: read-only checks of your own domain for exposed files, paid assets, secrets in browser code, headers and more |
| Runs in | Coding agents with parallel sub-agents, plus Node.js | Claude Code, Claude.ai (upload the zip), or any assistant that can read your code |
| Ranks findings by | Likelihood and impact, with a verdict of confirmed, needs validation or rejected | What it could cost the business: money, customer data, accounts, surprise bills |
| Ends with | Reports and a validated findings file | A plain-English report and a paste-ready fix brief for your coding agent, then a re-check |
| Catalogue | Broad attack classes | The specific mistakes AI-built apps make: public paid files, client-side prices, unsigned webhooks, open AI endpoints, prompt injection |
If you're auditing a large or unusual system, use Cloudflare's. It goes deeper. The source is at github.com/cloudflare/security-audit-skill.
What does the report look like?
Situation: A founder runs a store selling downloadable digital products, built with Next.js on Vercel using an AI coding agent. Products are delivered by email after a verified Stripe webhook. The founder asks for a Standard audit before running a promotion.
With the founder's permission, one read-only request:
GET https://example-store.com/products/premium-pack.zip
200 OK, Content-Type: application/zip, 6,120 bytesThe paid file downloads without signing in or paying. Filenames follow the product slugs listed on the public catalogue pages, so every product URL can be guessed.
Verdict: Proven.
Severity: High. No customer data is exposed, but every paid product is free to anyone who guesses the pattern, and one shared link spreads it.
Fix: move the files out of public/ to a folder the server reads but never serves; keep delivery by email after the verified webhook; if download links are needed, issue signed links that expire.
Confirm: the same GET returns 404, and a test purchase still delivers.
What won't it do?
- ✦Test any system the user has not confirmed they own or are authorized to test.
- ✦Send anything other than read-only GET or HEAD requests, attempt logins, submit forms, or run high-volume requests against a live site.
- ✦Write working exploit code, or include payloads that would work against third parties. Describe the attacker's steps in plain language instead.
- ✦Print full secret values in the report, chat or fix brief.
- ✦Change the user's code itself during the audit. It writes the fix brief; changes happen in a separate, deliberate step.
- ✦Inflate severity, or present hardening notes as vulnerabilities.
- ✦Claim the app is "secure". The report states what was checked and what was found, and lists what was not covered.
- ✦Replace a professional penetration test where a customer, regulator or insurer requires one.
Frequently asked questions
Another free one: Just Be British rewrites blunt AI emails into proper British ones.